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Abstract—Power distribution constitutes a critical service
for our economy. To foreseen electricity overload and risks
of power blackout according to external perturbations such as
the weather, the temperature or the barometric pressure in real
time is a crucial challenge. In order to face those problems,
research tends to involve consumers in the utilization of the
electricity based on weather conditions. Our previous works
had proposed an agent based architecture to support this alert
mechanism. The architecture exploited a static assignment of
functions to agents. That static assignment was a weak point
because isolating an agent or breaking the communication
channel between two of them created serious damage on the
crisis management. In this paper, we complete our previous
works and make mobile the assignment of functions mobile
for agents. Our approach exploits the concept of agent respon-
sibility that we dynamically assigned to the agent taking into
consideration the agent reputation.
I. INTRODUCTION
All around the globe, many regions keep suffering elec-
tric power blackout [1] when temperature is significantly
decreasing [2] [3]. E.g. Brittany in France recently had
to face such problems [4]. Brittany is a geographic and
administrative region of 13.136 square miles in the north-
west of France that, for some years, suffers from problems in
the power distribution especially during very cold weather.
For instance, in the week from the 14th to the 18th of
December 2009 the region was subject to an important
electric load forecast. The expected load for Monday the
14th was about 85200 Mega Watts (MW) and during the
evening (around 7PM), the load was expected to raise the
historical level of 92400 MW. The influence of the weather
conditions on the electric load is estimated at2100MW by
1F◦. This rate is important especially since we know that
the temperature of the current winter is between 6 and 8F◦
higher that the average.
As electricity is a not storable good, its production has to
precisely fit to its consumption. To maintain and guarantee
the balance, electric companies supervise the transport of the
power and manage the electric network. They keep watching
in real time both production and consumption values to
maintain the safety of the system. In case of a productivity
problem, solutions are deployed like the importation of
power from adjoining countries or the counseling of users
request, made via TV and newspapers, to adapt the usage
of electric machines (e.g. washing machine or dryer).
Our state of the art in this field [5] has highlighted that
many architectures have already been elaborated to support
the reaction after the problem’s detection. Those architec-
tures are mostly elaborated based on a multi-agent system
(MAS) approach which offers the possibility to work in a
decentralized and heterogeneous environment. However, we
have observed that those architectures are based on a static
assignment of functions to agents and that, as a consequence,
isolating an agent or breaking the communication channel
between two of them could create serious damage to the
management of the crisis. In this paper, we propose an
innovative approach for making the assignment of functions
dynamic to agents. Our approach exploits the concept of
agent responsibility that we dynamically assign depending
on the crisis situation. Additionally, the crisis context makes
vary the agent ability to react (e.g. the agent is momentarily
isolated or has a decreased capability to react quickly). In
order to consider that constraints, we introduce the agent
reputation as a parameter that influences the assignment.
The remainder of this paper is composed as follows.
Section II depicts the broadcasting mechanism. Section III
presents the responsibility model and section IV introduces
the reputation calculus method. Finally, the section V shows
how the reputation is used to the dynamic assignment of
responsibilities to agents and section 6 concludes the paper.
II. BROADCASTING MECHANISM CASE STUDY
The broadcasting mechanism (Fig. 1) aims at sending
alerts to the population using media such as a SMS whenever
a weather alert occurs. This section presents the core com-
ponents of the broadcasting mechanism. The solution relies
on a MAS technology on the top of the JADE framework
[6]. Agents are disseminated on three layers corresponding
to the geographical region (city, region or country) and they
retrieve information from probes located in weather station
and on the electric networks and representing with different
values: Pressure, temperature and electric voltage.
The agents that compose the architecture are the follow-
ing:
The Alert Correlation Engine (ACE) collects, aggregates
and analyses weather informations coming from probes
deployed over the network and weather stations. Confirmed
alerts are sent to the Policy Instantiation Engine (PIE).
The PIE receives confirmed alert from the ACE, sets the
severity level and the extent of the geographical response.
The PIE instantiates high level alert messages which have
to be deployed. Finally the high level alert messages are
transferred to the Message Supervising Point (MSP).
Figure 2. MSP architecture
The MSP (Fig. 2) is composed of two modules. The
Policy Analysis (PA) is in charge of analyzing the policies
previously instantiated by the PIE. Therefore, the Policy
Status database stores all communication policies and their
current status (in progress, not applicable, by-passed, en-
forced, removed. . . ) so that the PA module can check the
consistency of the newly received message to be deployed.
The second module is the Component Configuration Mapper
that selects the appropriate communication channel.
Figure 3. MBP architecture
Fig. 3 presents two different kinds of Message Broad-
casting Point (MBP). Indeed, another advantage of MAS is
that it is easy to implement from a model, specific agents
in order to perform specific tasks. Concretely it enables us
to use a different channel of communication (e.g. SMS, e-
mail, micro-blogging) to send alerts to citizens, hospitals,
etc. By this way our electric blackout prevention system is
easily extensible for future communications facilities. MBPs
receive generic alert messages from the MSP. Then a specific
parser converts the incoming alert message to the appropriate
format according to the channel.
In order to consider the mutual trust between agents, each
agent maintains within it a database of levels of trust towards
its pairs. This means e.g. that the MBP has a dedicated level
of trust for the ACE and the MSP.
The broadcasting alert architecture presented in this sec-
tion is based on the ReD project [7]. The ReD (Reaction after
Detection) project defines and designs a solution to enhance
the detection/reaction process and improves the overall
resilience of critical infrastructures. Fig. 4 introduces the
developed architecture illustrated with our weather broadcast
alert system. The flow is supposed to begin with an alert
detected by a probe.
This alert is sent to the ACE agent (City layer) that
does or does not confirm the alert to the PIE. Afterwards,
the PIE decides to apply new policies or to forward the
alert to an ACE of a higher layer (Region Layer). The
PIE agent sends the policies to the MSP agent, which
decides which MBP is able to transform the high level
alert message into an understandable format for the selected
communication channel. In order to manage access rights,
we have incorporated to ReD a Context Rights Management
module (CRM). Block on the right on Fig. 4. The CRM is
in charge of providing access rights to agents (E.g. MBP
to the probes and Logs File database, MSP to the Policy
Rules Status database). The CRM uses the rights and the
crisis context database. The first database includes the access
rights corresponding to the responsibilities and the second
database includes a set of crisis contexts. Thanks to these
databases the CRM agent is able to provide adequate rights
at operational layer to an agent depending on the context.
III. AGENT RESPONSIBILITY MODEL
In a non-crisis context, agents are assigned to respon-
sibilities like MSP, PIE, MBP, etc. Those assignments of
responsibilities to agents require specific access rights. By
analyzing for instance the activity of monitoring the power
network (Fig. 4), we can e.g. observe that the MBP’s have
the responsibility to collect the voltage on the power line or
the weather parameters, to make a basic correlation between
the values and the antecedent values records (stocked in
the Logs File database) and to report this analysis to the
ACE in case of suspected alert. To perform the monitoring
activity, the MBP are assigned to precise obligations and
gain corresponding access rights recorded in the access
right database. Those rights are e.g.: access to temperature
or voltage values. When a crisis occurs, for instance if a
hurricane isolates some MBP agents from the rest of the
network, the normal monitoring rules and procedures do
no longer work as usual and it is requested to change the
responsibility of the agents. In the above case, other agents
have to assure the responsibilities of the isolated MBP. To
assure their new responsibilities the agents request additional
Figure 1. Broadcasting Mechanism inside
Figure 4. Detailed reaction architecture for power distribution adaptation based on weather parameters
access rights e.g. monitoring probes related to the isolated
power line.
In practice, the automatic assignment of rights to agents
depending on their responsibilities is not immediate and
this contradicts the need to react promptly to the attack
or to the problem (e.g. hurricane). To tackle the weakness,
our approach is based on the refinement of the agent
responsibility and on the granting of access rights based on
responsibility. The right management module exploits two
databases accessed by the CRM agent. The first database
includes the rights corresponding to the responsibilities and
the second includes a set of crisis contexts. Each crisis
context defines, depending on the type of crisis, which agent
is assigned to which responsibility.
The review of the literature highlights that the definition
of the agent responsibility is mostly incomplete and that
most of the architecture only considering the agent regarding
the outcome that it has to produce. Sometimes, advanced
solutions integrate the inputs that those agents request to
perform the outcome. We define responsibility as a state
assigned to an agent to signify him its obligations concerning
the task, its accountabilities regarding its obligations, and the
rights and capabilities necessary to perform it.
In order to integrate a dynamic re-assignment of the
responsibility from one agent working in normal conditions
to one agent working in a crisis environment, we consider
all the concepts which compose the responsibility. In [8]
we have proposed a responsibility model that can be used
to depict the agent responsibility. This model integrates the
main following concepts:
Obligation is a duty which links a responsibility with a
task that must be performed.
Accountability is a duty to justify achievement, mainte-
nance or avoidance of some given state to an authority under
the threat of sanction [9]. Accountability contribute to gen-
erate trust or to remove trust depending of the accountability
outcomes.
Right encompasses facilities required by an agent to fulfill
his obligations, e.g. the access right that the agent gets once
it is assigned responsible.
Capability describes the requisite qualities, skills or re-
sources necessary to perform a task. Capability may be
declined through knowledge or know-how, possessed by the
agent such as ability to make a decision, its processing time,
its faculty to analyze a problem, and its position on the
network.
Figure 5. Agent responsibility model
Commitment pledged by the agent represents its engage-
ment to fulfill a task and the assurance that it does it in
respect of good practices. The commitment in MAS has
already been subject to many researches as explained in [10].
Based on the agent responsibility model of Fig. 5, we
define the responsibilities for each agent of the architecture.
Table I summarizes the MBP and the ACE responsibilities
used in practice for the dynamic assignment (section V). Due
to the extent of this paper, only the responsibility for two of
them is presented: the MBP and the ACE, and only the 4
most significant components of the responsible are exploited:
Obligations, Trust, Capabilities and Rights. For the MBP, we
observe that responsibility includes obligations such as the
obligation to retrieve logs from the component it monitors,
to provide an immediate reaction if necessary, to report
the incident to the MSP, etc. To perform this obligation,
it needs the capabilities to be on the same network as the
component it controls and to communicate with the ACE
and the facilitator agent. It also must have the right to read
the weather and power line parameters on the concerned
network component and to write the values down in a central
logs database.
IV. TRUST AND REPUTATION MANAGEMENT
The semantic analyzes commitment [11], [12] and ad-
vocates to consider the mutual trust between agents as a
pragmatic commitment antecedent [13] (Fig. 6). The trust
component signifies the lower trust value that is necessary
for an agent to be assigned responsible and is determined
by the importance of the obligation that is to be achieved.
Figure 6. Trust and commitment relationships
The trust and reputation model (TRM) evaluates the role
fulfillment of each component involved in the architecture.
A large review of computational trust models can be found
in [14] and more details for cognitive aspects of trust is
presented in [15].
The proposed reputation-based trust management scheme
is used to predict the future behavior of a component in
order to establish trust among agents and hence to improve
security in the system. The way trust information is quanti-
fied depends on the application field. Some authors used
probabilistic approaches [16] [17] [18] to quantify trust.
This approach is used in several fields such as Mobile
Ad-hoc Networks, Social Networks or e-commerce. Other
approaches such as Fuzzy approaches or Bayesian networks
[19][20][21] are also exploited to quantify trust with some
differences, if a ageing factor is used or not, the way rep-
utation parameters are aggregated. The information needed
to evaluate the trustworthiness of a component is provided
by the MBP’s probe.
As mentioned in the agent responsibility specifications,
if one of the MBP’s agents is not trustworthy because for
instance it has been corrupted, it has to be removed and
replaced. The assignment of a new responsibility to another
MBP (MBP1 or MBP2 in Fig. 7) is done based on the trust
value of that agent.
Obligations Trust Capabilities Rights
SAVP
• Retrieve the logs from the
component he monitors;
• Provide an immediate reac-
tion if necessary;
• Communicate with the facil-
itator to get the address of
the other components (ACE,
CRM);
• Report the incident to the
ACE.
0.8
• SAVP must be on the same
network as the parameter
(browser, ATM, shop, etc.)
he monitors;
• SAVP must be able to com-
municate with the ACE and
the facilitator agent.
Read parameter value on the con-
cerned network component Write
parameter value in the central logs
database
ACE
• Decide which keys are ap-
propriated to be deployed by
the SAVP;
• Confirm the alert to the PIE;
• Communicate with the facil-
itator to get the address of




• High CPU resources;
• Central position on the net-
work.
• No specific right.
Table I
AGENTS RESPONSIBILITIES SPECIFICATIONS
Figure 7. Reputation Repartion Schema
The trust (T) and reputation (R) of each component is
provided by trust assessment regarding an MBP agent based
on direct information collected by the MBP agents himself
and by second hand-information coming from other ACE to
which it belongs. This trust based reputation is calculated at
time t as follows:
TACE1−MBP2 = RACE1−MBP2 = DRACE1−MBP2 (1)
Where DRACE1−MBP2 is the reputation derived from
the direct reputation of MBP2 in the view of ACE1. The
scenario depicted in Fig. 7 shows that ACE1 has no direct
connectivity with MBP2 and has to rely on information
coming from ACE2. In this case (1) leads to (2):
TACE1−MBP2 = RACE1−MBP2 = DRACE1−MBP2 +
λ ∗ IRACE1−MBP2 (2)
Where λ is the weighted factor associated to the reputation
value and IRACE1−MBP2 is the indirect reputation value
provided by other agents regarding agent MBP2. In the
followings we presented how the direct reputation (DR) and
the indirect reputation (IR) are calculated. The direct repu-
tation is defined as the probability evaluated by ACE1 that
ACE2 will achieve his goal at the next solicitation. Several
approaches can be used to deal with reputation information
such as Beta, Gaussian, Poisson, binomial. [20] prooves that
the Beta distribution system is the most promising due to its
flexibility and simplicity as well as its strong foundation on
the theory of statistics.
Our model used the Beta probability density function
Beta(α, β) as shown in equation (3) to represent direct
reputation.




Where θ represents the probability that the next event will
occur. This Beta function is indexed with two parameters α
and β, which represent the sum of positive and negative
assessment, respectively that ACE1 has for ACE2. We
consider that ACE1 rates ACE2 during an assessment in a
binary scale (positive (1), negative (0)). The direct reputation
value is the mean of the Beta distribution between ACE1=A
and ACE2=B. Reputation value for agent ACE2 about agent
ACE1 is calculated as the expectation value of Beta(α, β)
with E equal the standard deviation :
RACE1−ACE2 = E(Beta(α, β)) (4)
An agent ACE1 is trusted by agent ACE2 if and only
if RACE1−ACE2 ≥ τ where τ is a threshold value from
which the agent is considered trustworthy. This threshold is
defined by the responsibilities specifications. For instance,
the trust threshold for MBP agents is set to 0.8. Initially,
α = β = 0, which corresponds to uniform distribution and
indicates absence of knowledge.
RACE1−ACE2 = E(Beta(α, β)) =
α+ 1
α+ β + 2
(5)
The update of this reputation value is done with respect to
the Beta function. This trust represents the trustworthiness
of one agent to another. In order to highlight the impact of
recent behavior, the ageing factor is introduced. We assume
that this ageing factor g depends on the context. This value
is update in (6) as follows:
A small value of g gives more weight to recent trust
values. However choosing the right value of g is not straight-
forward. For this purpose, we assume that the value of g is
chosen by a Human at the initialization of the system. Unlike
the components weights which represents the personal view
that an agent has to another.
Our solution for setting components weights is based on
the similarity beliefs between two agents. This similarity is
based on the assumption that if two agents rate a third agent
in the same way, this means that they have similar beliefs
and views of this agent. Given two agents ACE1 and ACE2,
let the set (ACE1, ACE2) be the set of all mutual agents,
that both ACE1 and ACE2 have interacted with and hence
have a direct reputation with those agents in (7) as follows:
Set(ACE1, ACE2) = {c, d, e, ..., n} (7)
The similarity belief (Λ) between those two agents is
given in (8).
Λ = Sim(ACE1, ACE2) = 1−Dis(ACE1, ACE2) (8)
Where the distance function between 2 agents ACE1,
ACE2 is calculated in (9) based on the Euclidian method.
By doing that, an agent can have no common direct
history with another and in the same time have a trustworthy
(or not) view of that agent.
Table II represents the reputation value that the agents
have for each other based on their common past interaction
history. The grey boxes represent the reputation that agent
has about itself. This is not possible since we assume that
reputation is not reflexive. The unknown value means that
CRM has no common history with that agent.
Agents ACE1 ACE2 λ CRM CRM
MBP1 unknown 0.6 unknown 0.8
MBP2 unknown 0.8 unknown 0.9
MBP3 unknown 0.1 unknown 0.16
ACE1 0.8 0.6 0.8
ACE2 0.9 0.7 0.7
Table II
EXAMPLE OF REPUTATION CALCULATION
V. EXAMPLE OF RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGNMENTS BASED
ON REPUTATION.
In this section, we introduce a simple use-case allowing
to show how the reputation (see Section IV) impacts the
responsibilities yield to the agents (see Section III) thanks
to the Context Right Management (CRM) module.
To assign responsibilities to agents, we have associ-
ated our architecture with UTOPIA [22] an insTitution
Oriented ProgrammIng frAmework which aims at simplify-
ing agent-based institutions programming. This framework
uses MOISEInst[13] Organizational Specification. In our
case, we specify the responsibilities using MOISEInst and
deploy the underlying MAS with UTOPIA.
Figure 8. MOISEInst organization
MOISEInst (Fig. 8) is composed of four dimensions:
• Structural Specification (SS);
• Functional Specification (FS);
• Contextual Specification (CS);
• Normative Specification (NS).
NS CS SS FS
N1 sMBP1/V rMBP1 mV = {gV }
N2 sMBP2/TB rMBP2 mTV = {gT ‖ gV }
N3 sMBP2/TBP rMBP2 mTBP = {gT ‖ gB ‖ gP}
N4 sMBP3/TP rMBP3 mTP = {gT ‖ gP}
Table III
SAMPLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL SPECIFICATION
The table III shows the Organizational Specification of our
example. We focus on the responsibility assignment of three
agents having the roles rMBP1, rMBP2 and rMBP3. The
responsibilities are decomposed as following obligations: V
αnewACE1−ACE2 = g ∗ αACE1−ACE2 and βnewACE1−ACE2 = g ∗ βACE1−ACE2 (6)
Dis(ACE1, ACE2) =
√
(RACE1−ACE2 −RACE2−ACE3)2 + ...+ (RACE1−ACEn −RACE2−ACEn)2 (9)
stands for monitoring a Voltmeter, T for the Temperature, B
for a Barometer and P for Pressure.
We encode the obligations using contexts of the Con-
textual Specification, for instance sMBP3/TP is a context
associated to the role rMPB3 and it is linked to the respon-
sibility of monitoring the temperature and the pressure. The
Fig 9 shows all the contexts described in Table III and the
transitions. One can observe that transition are a way to
reflect the capability aspect of the responsibility model, for
instance the transition “/sMBP2/a” between TB and TBP
means that MBP2 is capable of measuring pressure.
UTOPIA uses concrete actions, called goals, to influence
the behavior of agents and these goals can be regrouped into
missions. For instance the mission mTV = {gT ‖ gV }
means running in parallel the actions of probing into a
thermometer and a voltmeter.
Figure 9. Contextual Specification
Finally the Norms make the link between Roles (SS),
Contexts (CS) and Goals (FS) and allow to get this behavior:
• Initially MBP1 is in context V and N1 forces it to do
gV . MBP2 is in TB and N2 forces it to do gT and
gV in parallel. MBP3, through norm N4 monitors a
Thermometer and the Pressure (TP).
• If the transition “/sMBP2/a” is sent, UTOPIA will
change the context to “/sMBP2/TBP” and the agent will
have the additional responsibility to probe the pressure
as the Norm N3 replace N2.
Using UTOPIA make the dynamically assignment of re-
sponsibilities to agents simpler. In order to illustrate deeper
the link between reputation and responsibility we reuse the
values of reputation summarized into Table II.
1) Under a threshold of 0.5 the CRM considers that an
agent is no longer trustworthy. According to Table II,
the trust level of MBP3 is set to 0.16. Consequently
the CRM is able to detect a problem with MBP3
and have to find a solution to dynamically transfer
its responsability.
2) The CRM inspects the contextual state of the institu-
tion and detects that MBP2 has the capacity of taking
MBP3’s responsibility. In our simple case MBP2 is
alone but if several agents have the capability to
replace an agent, the hightest reputed is choosen. In
order to transfer the responsability of MBP3 to MBP2,
the CRM simply sends the transition “/sMBP2/a“ and
the final transition for MBP3.
That allows UTOPIA to reorganize the agents’ re-
sponsibilities taking into consideration the agents’
reputation. As consequence, MBP3 loses its access
rights, is isolated and its responsibilities are transferred
to the MBP2 which has a reputation of 0.9;
3) The agent MBP2 that receive the additional MBP3’s
responsibilities requests the underlying access rights
to the CRM.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Critical infrastructures are more and more present and
needs to be seriously managed and monitored regarding the
increasing amount of threats. This paper presents a solution
to broadcast weather forecast alerts messages using a MAS
based architecture. The system, initially developed based on
static assignments of responsibilities to agents, has needs for
more dynamism in order to keep aligned to the new arising
risks.
This paper firstly addresses this new challenge by provid-
ing a framework for dynamically assigning responsibilities
to agents depending on the crisis context. That contextual-
ized responsibility assignment permits, in fine, to manage
the agent access rights to critical information.
Secondly, the paper enhances this dynamic assignment
by taking into account the trust and reputation between
the agents during the assignment mechanism. Each agent
is responsible to store and fuse different source of infor-
mation. Information coming from prior direct experiences
is represented by direct reputation and information coming
from other is represented by indirect reputation.
The architecture we exploit to demonstrate the enhanced
reaction mechanism, relies on the two main pillars ReD and
UTOPIA, which are being tested and currently produced in
our labs. Practically ReD defines the structural bases for
the weather broadcasting and UTOPIA permits to deploy the
responsibilities to agents. The paper is illustrated based on a
use case that shows how the transfer of rights for a corrupted
MBP is performed during an evolution from normal to crisis
situation.
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